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A B S T R A C T 
Truth Commissions (TCs) constitute a very important transitional justice 
mechanism but its effectiveness is difficult to measure. In this paper three categories 
are suggested to measure TCs’ impact: the accomplishment of its mandate and 
objectives; the issuing of a final report; and, the achievement of certain political 
impact with its recommendations (Brahm, 2007; Ceballos Medina, 2009). The 
Colombian Truth Commission proposal issued by the Government and the FARC-EP 
on June 4th of 2015 is analyzed here under these categories to determine challenges 
and opportunities for its implementation. This is a reflective exercise that focuses 
only on the proposal but recognizes that the construction of truth and historical 
memory depend on many other aspects of the negotiations.
KEY WORDS: Colombia, FARC-EP, transitional justice, 
truth commission, victims.
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R E S U M E N
Las Comisiones de la Verdad (CV) constituyen un mecanismo de justicia 
transicional muy importante, pero su efectividad es difícil de medir. Este artículo 
sugiere tres categorías para medir el impacto de las CV: el cumplimiento de sus 
mandatos y objetivos; la expedición de un reporte final; y, el logro de cierto impacto 
político con sus recomendaciones (Brahm, 2007; Ceballos Medina, 2009). La 
propuesta de una Comisión Colombiana de la Verdad expedida por el Gobierno 
y las FARC-EP el 4 de Junio de 2015 es analizada aquí bajo estas categorías para 
determinar retos y oportunidades para su implementación. Este es un ejercicio 
pragmático que se enfoca únicamente en la propuesta pero que reconoce que la 
construcción de verdad y memoria histórica depende de muchos otros aspectos de 
las negociaciones. 
PALABR AS CLAVE: Colombia, FARC-EP, justicia 
transicional, comisión de la verdad, víctimas.
R E S U M O
As Comissões da Verdade (CV) constituem um mecanismo muito importante da 
justiça de transição, mas a sua eficácia é difícil de medir. O presente artigo sugere 
três categorias para medir o impacto das CV: o cumprimento de seus mandatos e 
objetivos; a emissão de um relatório final; e o atingimento de um certo impacto 
político através das suas recomendações (Brahm de 2007, Ceballos Medina, 2009). A 
proposta de conformação de uma Comissão Colombiana da Verdade, emitida pelo 
governo e as FARC-EP no dia 04 de junho de 2015 é analisada aqui através destas 
categorias, para determinar os desafios e oportunidades da sua implementação. 
Embora seja este um exercício pragmático, concentrado exclusivamente na 
proposta, reconhece-se que a construção da verdade e da memória histórica 
depende de muitos outros aspectos das negociações.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Colômbia, FARC-EP, justiça de 
transição, comissão da verdade, vítimas.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Societies in transition from war to peace face the challenge of 
adopting transitional justice strategies that respond effectively to 
past abuses and determine the truth about what happened and 
why; acknowledge victims’ suffering; guarantee perpetrator’s 
accountability; compensate for past wrongdoings; seek no repetition; 
and, promote social healing (Hayner, 1994; USIP, 2008). Criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation and compensation 
programs, and institutional reforms are the four processes 
believed to constitute the core of transitional justice, although the 
relationships between them do not follow any specific formula. The 
characteristics of these tasks depend partially on the particularities 
of the context, the nature of the abuses (systematic, ethnic, State-
led), the political, judicial and economic structures characterizing 
the new Government and the victims’ and society’s expectations. 
Bearing that in mind, every mechanism has pros and cons for an 
effective transition. (USIP, 2008; Sandoval, 2011)1. 
This paper will focus on the role of Truth Commissions 
(hereinafter TCs), whose objective is “to ascertain the facts 
and causes of systemic abuse in the most objective way possible 
1 “In addition to these core processes, others have become part of the transitional 
justice agenda: primarily, national consultations, which have been strongly recommended 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for HHRR (OHCHR) and the Peace building 
Commission, which emphasize that “meaningful public participation” is essential for 
the success of any transition (A/HRC/12/18, 2009, and A/63/881-S/2009/304, 2009). 
National consultations should take place in relation to different aspects of transitional 
justice. Finally, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), which usually 
take place in parallel, rather than as part of the transitional justice processes, actively 
interact with it and complement transitional justice mechanisms and policies. DDR 
focuses on helping ex-combatants to stop fighting and to reintegrate into society 
(Waldorf, 2009). While all these processes are important, this report focuses on the 
core processes of transitional justice, namely: justice, reparation, truth and institutional 
reform” (Sandoval, 2011, p. 3f).
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(…) exactly what kind of abuses occurred and why, and how to 
prevent their recurrence in the future, but in a non-criminal 
context” (USIP, 2008, p. 3). The aim of this paper is to explore the 
importance of TCs in the transitional justice and to outline the 
practical characteristics that make a TC successful. Afterwards, 
these findings will be applied to the TC proposal of the Colombian 
Government and the FARC-EP, called: Commission for the 
Clarification of Truth, Conviviality, and Non Repetition, which will 
be implemented once the peace agreement between the parties is 
signed. Challenges and possible opportunities for this upcoming TC 
in Colombia will be drafted. 
i. Truth and truth telling mechanisms 
in the transitional justice
Do victims of Human Rights (hereinafter HHRR) atrocities want 
to remember or do they want to forget? For many, recognizing the 
truth of what happened in war represents a chance to know and 
clarify under what circumstances they or their loved ones became 
a target of violence (Becker, 2006). Truth is the right of victims to 
know what happened and how and the right of society to know the 
dynamics of a violent past (Uprinmy/Saffon, 2006; Antequera, 2014). 
For victims, truth telling and harm acknowledgment are crucial 
to heal; without them, it is impossible to move on (Villa-Vicencio, 
2006; Brahm, 2007; ICTJ, 2013). In this sense, TCs play an important 
role in overcoming the violent past because they contribute to the 
reparation of victims and the eventual reconciliation of the society 
in question (Uprinmy/Saffon, 2006; Twose/Mahoney, 2015). 
In recent decades, TCs have become one of the principal 
mechanisms for peace building, especially when political transitions 
are the product of a negotiation and not of the victory of one side 
of the conflict (Llewellyn, 2006; Brahm, 2007). They contribute 
mainly to restorative justice that “emphasizes transforming anger, 
resentment and vengeance to build community particularly by 
emphasizing reconciliation” (Brahm, 2007, p. 19). It is a type of 
justice focused on the restoration of past relationships and national 
history, in order to create a new society (Llewellyn, 2006; Sandoval, 
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2011; Castillejo, 2014; Bakiner, 2014). The instauration of TCs seeks 
to address needs and social expectations the courts cannot fulfill. 
One of the main differences between criminal justice and TCs is that 
the former deals with individual truth, whereas the latter clarifies 
collective truths. As a result, TCs cannot be expected to find the 
ultimate truth for all individual cases (ICTJ, 2008; Hayner, 2011). 
 Definition, characteristics and challenges  
of truth commissions
TCs are “Official investigative bodies [created by the State] 
comprised of independent experts that are responsible for 
investigating and reporting on patterns of HHRR abuses over a 
certain period of time in a particular country or in relation to a 
particular conflict. TCs allow victims, their relatives and perpetrators 
to give evidence of HHRR abuses, providing an official forum for 
their accounts” (USIP, 2008, p. 6). 
The commissions have various characteristics. According 
to Hayner (2011), they are focused on past, rather than ongoing 
events; they investigate a pattern of events that took place over a 
period of time (not just individual abuses); they engage directly 
and broadly with the affected population, gathering information 
directly from their experiences (Interview witnesses, conduct site 
visits, and hold hearings); they are temporal (typically 6 months - 2 
years); and, they are officially authorized by the State (created by 
official law or decree with wide powers of investigation). Moreover, 
TCs have “a specific mandate identifying the acts and time period 
to be investigated; are led by a diverse group of independent experts 
(typically 3 - 9 individuals); and produce and disseminate a final 
report, including conclusions and recommendations on how to 
prevent future abuses” (USIP, 2008, p. 6).
TCs should conduct profound investigations that include 
hearings, statement taking and research, all of them accompanied 
by victims’ and witnesses’ support mechanisms. Since commissions 
deal with sensitive issues, they should avoid re-victimizing (even by 
the way questions are asked) and guarantee victims’ physical and 
psychological security. In regard to hearings and statement taking, 
specially trained personnel are the ones who will have direct contact 
with victims. These people have a challenging role because they 
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should respectfully listen to victims and at the same time fulfill 
technical requirements for data collection (USIP, 2008). Public 
hearings, like the ones conducted in the Timorese TC, provide the 
opportunity to examine the indirect and direct responsibility of 
various sectors in facilitating and neglecting serious HHRR abuses 
(ibíd.). This tool is very useful because it reduces the possibility of 
denial and increases the transparency of the commission.
Research and investigation in TCs have the capacity to connect 
individual case investigations with thematic research (ICTJ, 2008). 
For this purpose, it is necessary to have considerable resources and 
experts in order to conduct robust investigations. Some commissions 
have also used information management systems in order to record 
information, establish patterns of abuse and provide further 
analysis and estimates about HHRR abuses. An example of this is 
the Peruvian TC that estimated killing and enforced disappearance 
figures through Multiple-Systems Estimation (MSE) (Landman/
Carvahlo, 2010). It is important to notice that the more powers 
the commission has, the more abundant the resources and the 
investigative capacities it should have (USIP, 2008). 
Given their insightful investigations, TCs are able to collect 
information far better that any other available historical record, 
resulting in a final report of the disputed events. Final reports are 
frequently the most visible legacy of the commissions and they 
influence how society in general understands the conflict and its 
national history. “Final reports include the facts and patterns of 
abuse as determined by the commission, analysis of responsibility, 
information on the victims and recommendations for steps to deal 
with the legacy of the abuses” (USIP, 2008, p. 10). Nevertheless, 
taking into account the circumstances in which TCs operate, the 
report might never be issued (case of Bolivia) or it may concentrate 
only in a small number of cases or in a specific crime (case of 
Argentina) (Hayner, 1994).
TCs may face some challenges during investigations that 
could hinder not only the issue of a final report but also the results 
themselves. First, commissions can be subject to intimidation and 
political pressure when truth might be inconvenient for people in 
power and therefore, evidence could be destroyed, the access to it 
might be denied, threats to victims may occur or the perpetrators 
and their political allies might try to pressure the TC to adopt 
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a biased approach in the investigation (Hayner, 1994; Brahm, 
2007). Second, the design of a truth for amnesty formula might be 
challenging. “While the ‘truth for amnesty’ formula was used in 
South Africa, it was backed by a credible threat of prosecution of 
those who did not apply for amnesty or did not present the entire 
truth in their amnesty application” (USIP, 2008, p. 11). Third, the 
society and the victims might have unrealistic expectations about the 
TC’s scope and powers (Becker, 2006). And finally, resources for TCs 
might be limited (Sandoval, 2011). If, in spite of the aforementioned 
difficulties, the report is issued, it should become public domain 
and reveal the country’s own history, until then denied or unknown 
(Hayner, 2011). 
Past TCs have published summaries of their final reports; 
special reports in newspapers; and, even some of them have made 
public the perpetrators’ list. In South Africa the TC handed 
a list of suspected perpetrators for 300 cases to the judicial 
authorities and called for rigorous attention to the prosecution 
authorities. However, little action resulted from it (Hayner, 2011). 
After the release of the TCs’ results, a public political apology or 
acknowledgment might follow. Those who have suffered want to 
know why they were made to suffer and who was responsible; they 
want an acknowledgment from the person(s) involved or some 
specific institution (Government, truth commission). “Where, 
however, acknowledgment comes from the actual perpetrator and 
includes an apology, the possibility of reconciliation is frequently 
further enhanced” (Villa-Vicencio, 2006, p. 71).
Another important consequence of TC’s results is that they 
might be directed to help to counter impunity either by passing 
their files to the prosecuting authorities or by recommending other 
sanctions to advance in criminal accountability, for example with 
vetting and other institutional reforms (Hayner, 2011). Nevertheless, 
history shows that TCs’ findings have rarely been used in criminal 
proceedings (Mendez, 1997 cited by Brahm, 2007) and the 
influence of TCs’ recommendations remains weak. “Government 
implementation is hard. Even when a TC mandate requires that 
a Government adopt its recommendations, there are often few 
resources available for the task, and political will may erode as time 
passes” (USIP, 2008, p. 12). In order to monitor the implementation 
of TCs’ recommendations and to continue investigations and 
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preserve the archives, mechanisms for follow-up might be established. 
An existing institution can deploy these mechanisms, a new one 
could be created or the civil society might as well take this role.
Lastly, TCs may be given a mandate for reconciliation although 
the accomplishment of this task depends on many other conditions 
apart from the clarification of past abuses. TCs can be helpful 
in advancing towards national reconciliation because they can 
perform official accounting and draw conclusions about the facts 
and conflicts, which allow opposing parties to debate and govern 
together (Hayner, 2011).
 Truth commission design: Mandates  
and composition 
TCs should have a mandate that provides the guideline to perform 
the subsequent work, although these mandates may be very diverse 
(Hayner, 1994; Sandoval, 2011; Antequera, 2014). The mandate 
establishes the scope of investigation and the abuses to be covered, 
the time-period to be examined and the functions a TC has in 
relation to criminal justice (Ceballos, 2009). In addition, the 
mandate should specify which actors are to be examined in the 
commission and the territory where the violations occurred (ICTJ, 
2013). It should be tailor-made according to the characteristics of 
the country and the specific needs of the society.
For example, the famous South African TC had the power to 
investigate crimes committed during apartheid, including the 
use of subpoena and seizure powers, to have public hearings, and 
to recommend the granting of an amnesty for perpetrators in 
exchange for full disclosure. This commission was also allowed to 
award interim reparations and to make recommendations in this 
respect. In contrast, the Argentinean National Commission on 
the Disappeared (Conadep) was mandated only to investigate the 
disappearances that took place in the country between 1976 and 
1983, without subpoena or seizure powers. (Sandoval, 2011, p. 8)
Despite the differences from case to case, according to the 
USIP (2008) a TC mandate should have the following elements: 
clear objectives; legal authority to interview witnesses and 
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collect testimony, including in some cases the power to compel 
such testimony; defined types of violations the commission will 
investigate; specific time period to be investigated; defined time 
granted to the commission to complete its work; and, an identified 
authority to issue recommendations. Another important component 
of the commissions is its composition and staff. These are important 
elements for the legitimacy of the commission that not only depend 
on the commissioners’ qualifications, backgrounds and expertise, 
but also on the selection process (USIP, 2008).
 Truth commission measurement and impact 
After explaining the importance and the elements that constitute a 
TC, some questions remain. What makes a TC successful? How can 
the impacts of its results be measured? According to Brahm (2007), 
the literature about TC in this regard is rather ambiguous, relying 
merely on anecdotes and moral convictions. Furthermore, “while 
many HHRR advocates have become sold on truth commissions, 
these transitional justice mechanisms have been increasingly 
criticized as either ineffectual substitutes for prosecution or as 
potentially destabilizing forces in the midst of delicate transitions” 
(Brahm, 2007, p.17). Scholars can then be divided into three groups 
when thinking about TCs’ impact. The ones who support them as 
a mechanism providing redress for victims (Minow, 1998; Boraine, 
2000), the ones who see them as weak substitutes of prosecution 
(Fitzpatrick, 1995; Brody, 2001) and the ones who criticize their 
fomenting of different interpretations of history (Brahm, 2007; 
Llewellyn, 2006). 
Despite these difficulties, the literature on this topic has 
outlined a set of objectives the commissions should accomplish. The 
basic ones included in this paper, are: 1). The achievement of its 
mandate, 2). The accomplishment of its objectives, and 3). The issue 
of a final report and recommendations, which are expected to have 
some political and social impact (Ceballos, 2009). 
In terms of impact, one big success of TCs is when they can 
influence institutional reform (Bakiner, 2014). “It is essential that 
there is implementation and follow up to the recommendations of 
TCs by the Government and State authorities to prevent further 
heinous crimes and to help the State to move towards reconciliation 
31
IN
G
R
ID
 M
A
R
IS
O
L
 O
R
T
IZ
 A
C
O
S
T
A
and peace” (OHCHR, truth commissions, 2006 cited by Sandoval, 
2011, p. 8). Nevertheless, historically the influence of TCs’ 
recommendations is weak (Ceballos, 2009). An exception is the case 
of El Salvador and its institutional reforms to protect the procedural 
rights of defendants and victims (Hayner, 2011).
Bakiner (2014) argues that TCs’ impact could be explained in 
four ways: direct political impact, indirect political impact through 
civil society mobilization, vetting, and judicial accountability 
(positive and negative influence). Nevertheless, the measurement 
of these aspects would mean an exploration of the pre-commission 
context and then the post-commission one to assess the hypotheses. 
Impact is then constituted “by the content of the final report and, 
equally importantly, by the process itself. It is shaped, but not 
predetermined, by the mandate limits” (Bakiner, 2014, p. 15). 
In case of direct political impact, the most straightforward 
consequence is the inclusion of the TC’s recommendations 
into policy2, whereas for the non-direct political impact, social 
pressure in form of protests or other mechanisms is necessary for 
the Government to adopt the recommendations. Vetting is also a 
possible impact, consisting in the removal of perpetrators’ political 
supporters from the public office. Lastly, the judicial impact of TCs 
is still controversial and when it happens it is normally in a very 
limited scale (Bakiner, 2014).
ii. Methodology
Following the theoretical explanation on the aspects that constitute 
a successful TC, namely: 1). The achievement of its mandate, 2). The 
accomplishment of its objectives, and 3). The issue of a final report 
and recommendations, which are expected to have some political 
2 “Nevertheless, one observes near-universal demand for certain policies and political 
gestures, which I employ as indicators of direct political impact: Public endorsement 
of the commission’s work by Government leadership; government publication of the 
commission’s final report; implementation of a reparations program (this measure is 
applicable in 12 cases where the truth commission recommended reparations); and the 
creation of follow-up institutions to carry out the recommended reforms and monitor 
progress” (Bakiner, 2014, p. 20).
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and social impact, this paper will revise the TC proposal announced 
by the FARC-EP and the Colombian government in June 2015. To 
examine the theoretical proposition, a deep revision of the proposal 
will be conducted, classifying the proposal according to the three 
categories mentioned above. Secondary sources and newspaper 
examination will complement the observations. As the commission is 
still to be constituted, this paper is only a reflexive document based 
on a critical reading of the proposal and therefore, it constitutes a 
prospective exercise that could help practitioners think about the 
possible hurdles and voids the commission could face. Furthermore, 
in a final section the paper will provide some possible challenges to 
think about when the TC is actually established. 
iii. Truth commission with FARC-EP
On June 4th of 2015, the Government of Colombia and the FARC-
EP, the biggest and oldest guerrilla group in the country, published 
a common communiqué announcing their agreement on creating 
a TC called Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Conviviality 
and Non-Repetition. This commission is of utter importance to 
Colombian society given the long conflict between the parties that 
has led to a 220.000 death toll between 1958 and 2012 (CNMH, 
2013). The agreement follows the victims’ participation in the 
negotiations in La Habana and further emphasizes the need to hear 
these voices in the transitional justice. 
To make the decision whether or not a truth commission should 
be established, broad consultations with victims and civil society 
should be held. If critical resources, political will, or impartiality 
are lacking, it may be better not to convene a truth commission at 
all, rather than to initiate a process that will not be able to fulfill 
its goals. (USIP, 2008, p. 8)
In the case of Colombia, the institutional capability, the 
resources and the politics will exist. A prove of it is that the TC 
proposal is a common agreement of conflicting parties who are 
engaged in a peace process since October 2012. Furthermore, this is 
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the first time in Colombia that a TC (not limited to a Commission of 
Inquiry) will be created in common agreement with the conflicting 
parties3. In national history, a TC in the strict sense has not existed 
until now (García, 2014); HHRR violations have been discharged 
with silence pacts (Rojas Pinilla Dictatorship), amnesties (M-19 
and Palace of Justice Siege on the 6th November 1985) and other 
unilateral mechanisms such as Law 975/2005 used in the peace 
process with the paramilitaries (Ceballos, 2009; García, 2014).
In recent years, Colombia has advanced in policies to address 
the situation of victims in a possible post-conflict scenario. In 
2011, the Government issued Law 1448/2011, which establishes a 
reparation program and many institutions to identify victims, their 
harms and provide compensation. In this sense, the TC in Colombia 
arrives when many other transitional justice mechanisms are already 
in place. In terms of truth, the National Center of Historical Memory 
(hereinafter CNMH) has advanced in many emblematic cases of 
HHRR violations in the country and has published information 
about the history, dynamics and events that have characterized 
violence (García, 2014).
Moreover, the fifth point of the 10 principles for the 5th round 
of peace negotiations about Victims establishes that both parties, 
the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP, will contribute to 
the clarification of truth, including its causes, origins and effects 
as a fundamental requirement to satisfy victims’ rights and the 
society in general (Joint Communiqué Negociations, 7th June 2014). 
In order to achieve that, a Historical Clarification Commission 
(hereinafter CHC) was created to highlight the different truths and 
interpretations that exist about the Colombian conflict. Secondly, 
the United Nations jointly with the National University of Colombia 
summarized victims’ proposals in regard to many points of the 
negotiations’ agenda but particularly on truth, reparations, and 
non-repetition (Bouvier, 11th Novermber 2015). These initiatives, 
product of the negotiations, contain inputs that provide sufficient 
information for public and social deliberation, in particular for the
3 This paper will not explore in depth these previous attempts to uncover truth. See 
Ceballos (2009) for a description of other extrajudicial commissions that have been 
established in Colombia.
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task of collective memory and truth. In this regard, for Colombian 
society it is still necessary to know who did what, how, why and which 
were the power mechanisms that facilitated the abuses (Centro de 
Memoria Paz y Reconciliación, 2014). 
A report by the UN Independent Expert on Impunity states that,
Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about 
past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes 
[and specifically that] victims and their families have the 
imprescriptible right to know the truth about the circumstances 
in which violations took place. (Hayner, 2011, p. 24) 
As in this academic exercise it is not possible to know still 
if the Colombian TC will be successful, only the TC’s proposal 
will be analyzed in terms of what could be the opportunities and 
challenges for the commission to accomplish its mandate and 
objectives, issue the final report and to achieve certain impact with 
its recommendations. As it was already said, the effectiveness of TCs 
will depend on these three factors (Brahm, 2007).
iv. Analysis 
 Commission’s objectives
According to the 53rd communiqué of the negotiations in La 
Habana, the Colombian TC should achieve three fundamental 
objectives. First, it should clarify the truth about HHRR abuses 
product of the conflict and give a comprehensive explanation of the 
conflict as such, specially the most denied aspects of it. Secondly, 
it should contribute to recognize victims as subjects of law whose 
rights were violated and it establishes the need of a voluntary 
recognition of responsibility by the different conflicting parties. 
The third objective of the commission is to promote the peaceful 
coexistence of the society in the local level, creating dialogue 
environments where victims can be re-dignified and collective and 
individual accountability can be achieved (Jointly Communiqué 53, 
4th July 2015). This last objective is very important because war in 
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Colombia and its related HHRR abuses have concentrated mainly 
in rural areas. If the commission does not effectively work in a local 
and regional level, the results will not be optimal. 
In addition, this commission should acknowledge the dynamics 
behind violence such as the repression to political opposition and 
participation, crucial for national peace building. According to 
Antequera (2014), when TCs perceive only the roles of victims/
perpetrators in a two-sided confrontation, ignoring in turn the 
existence of policies and plans of political repression, elimination 
and suppression, these practices escape from the TCs’ scope, 
which frames an incomplete way of understanding the conflict 
and revealing the truth. Therefore, it might be necessary for the 
commission to explore the experiences of opposition and resistance 
within the conflicting history. 
The commission to be installed in Colombia has a very political 
and ethical content, and therefore it should remain completely 
impartial and independent from political forces. The composition 
of the TC will be of eleven commissioners designated by a selection 
committee. The selection committee will have nine members: the 
Government and the FARC-EP will select six of them jointly and the 
remaining three will be the representatives of three organizations 
also selected jointly during the negotiations (Joint Communiqué 
53, 4th July 2015). The problem here lies on what conditions and 
procedures there are to choose the last three members of the 
selection committee. This information is vague and it could make 
a big difference in the selection of the TC’s commissioners and 
therefore its impartiality. 
 Mandate
The TC’s mandate establishes as its first task the clarification of facts 
that constitute serious HHRR violations and grave infractions to the 
International Humanitarian Law, in particular those representing 
abuse patterns or those that were committed massively. It also 
emphasizes on the conflict dynamics in the local and regional levels 
(Joint Communiqué 53, 4th July 2015). The first question that arises 
with this mandate is how is this going to be possible in a conflict 
that has lasted so long? And how will the commission be articulated 
with other mechanisms of transitional justice such as the eventual 
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transitional trials? A very important issue in this regard, as well, is 
the clarification of truth for victims of enforced disappearance, for 
whom the TC constitutes a unique opportunity (Hayner, 2011) to 
know what happened to the 50.000 and more victims of this crime 
reported until 2011 (CNMH, 2013).
An important problem for the mandate’s implementation is 
also the fact that before the agreement on a TC, both sides, the 
Government and the guerrilla, have denied their responsibility in 
HHRR abuses. The FARC-EP has many times been reluctant to 
acknowledge its accountability on serious HHRR violations, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (La Silla Vacía, 4th June 2015). 
This could be their political strategy to preserve some legitimacy 
and avoid prosecution, but it could have severe implications for 
truth seeking. Besides, some political sectors continue referring 
to guerrillas as criminals, undermining the political component 
of the conflict that has in turn produced systematic violence. In 
addition, the Colombian State has also frequently denied a collective 
(institutional) responsibility in the conflict and this precedent may 
hinder the mandate’s scope (La Silla Vacía, 4th June 2015).
In this regard, the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2013) 
highlights that subordinating the truth to political goals is a mistake 
since a credible TC would help both sides on their long-term 
interests. On the Government side, a strong TC will help to cater 
victims and those who support them, advancing in an impartial 
environment. At the same time, the commission would give the 
FARC-EP a public forum to discuss their perspective on the conflict 
without making it a propaganda mechanism. The task of recognizing 
responsibility should be easier in a context where other actors are 
involved and it may even promote participation of ex-combatants. 
At this point, it is crucial to understand that a TC is simultaneously 
a political mechanism as well as an investigative process (Castillejo, 
2014). There is a tight relationship between the conditions of 
investigation (mandate, assumptions, objectives) and the different 
political national and international influences on the negotiation 
process. It is impossible to read the TC’s proposal and omit this fact.
The second point of the mandate proposes the clarification 
of collective responsibilities from the State, the Government, the 
public powers, the FARC-EP, the paramilitary forces and any other 
national or international organizations or institutions that have 
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directly or indirectly participated in the conflict. This point of the 
mandate is very ambitious because it tries to cover all the actors 
that have participated in more than 50 years of war. On one hand, 
this comprehensive approach would contribute to a more plural 
understanding of the conflict and it will show the different truths 
of multiple actors. It additionally exceeds the logic of the two-sided 
confrontation, unveiling the interests underneath war that have 
involved companies, foreign States, public institutions, etc. This 
approximation contrasts with the one assumed with Law 975/2005 
and the mandate of the National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation that only took into account the conflicting parties 
(Antequera, 2014; Castillejo, 2014).
On the other hand, in spite of the inclusivity of this approach 
it is very important to ask: is this possible? Can the Colombian TC 
resolve these issues in 3 years? In addition, the mandate includes the 
participation of Paramilitary Forces but they officially demobilized 
in 2003. Then, it is worth asking: what incentives would Paramilitary 
Forces get to cooperate with the TC at this point? Do they have 
important incentives for telling the truth? Will the TC cover crimes 
committed by new paramilitary groups? Lastly, the responsibility of 
international Governments and corporations in the escalation of 
violence in Colombia is beyond doubt but how are the procedures 
going to be? According to Hayner (2011, p. 78), “the role of foreign 
entities in supporting such Governments or armed groups is often 
an important part of the story, and thus should be investigated, 
or at least formally recognized, in a truth report”. The issue is 
how to keep a balance in the main core of the investigations and 
still acknowledge and investigate the role of foreign countries. In 
sum, the second point of the mandate seems to be too broad to be 
covered in 3 years’ time. 
The third, fourth and fifth points of the mandate deal with 
the impact of conflict in the society in general from a differentiated 
perspective that includes the particular impact on women, LGTBI, 
journalists, peasants, aborigines, children, among others. Point four 
deals especially with the impact on democracy and politics, focusing 
on the political parties and political movements, specially the 
opposition. Point five engages the impact of conflict on combatants 
and their families. In spite of the importance of these aspects for a 
collective construction of truth and memory, the description of tasks 
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is general and its scope is still not clear. However, it is remarkable 
that the mandate assumes a gender and differentiated perspective 
to tackle the impact of conflict. In Colombia, the majority of direct 
victims have been men, but the ones who assumed the related costs 
of the victimization of their husbands, sons, fathers and brothers, 
are women. Moreover, between 1985 and 2012, 2’420.887 women 
have been enforcedly displaced, 1.431 have been victims of sexual 
violence, 2.602 have been enforcedly disappeared and 12.624 have 
been murdered (CNMH, 2013). Thus, particular measures should 
be considered for the hearings, taking into account the nature of 
some of these crimes and the cultural barriers of speaking publically 
about them (ICG, 2013).
The sixth point of the mandate is to clarify the historical 
context, the origins and the multiple causes of the conflict, taking 
into account the findings of the CHC. This point is one of the 
most problematic ones, because it has not yet been established 
what period of time the TC will specifically cover. The formation 
of guerrillas started in 1964, but previously there are many 
historically related events that make it difficult to estimate when 
the conflict actually began (CHC, 2015). Neither the negotiators, 
nor the scholars of the CHC have agreed on it. This fact is 
problematic because the definition of a period of study could leave 
part of the truth behind or could overwhelm the whole process, 
raising expectations that would end up in frustration because 
the commission might not have the capacity (technical, financial, 
human) to fulfill its duties.
The seventh point of the mandate deals with the (structural) 
conditions that have contributed to the conflict’s duration. 
One could infer that among the different conditions, there are 
State institutions and officials who permitted the abuses. In this 
regard, the commission is expected to make recommendations 
for institutional reform but the implementation of these might be 
difficult if there is not an organization that would promote them. In 
particular, it is expected that an institution such as the Colombian 
Army will make a stand against any changes because they still do 
not recognize their collective responsibility in HHRR violations in 
Colombia (La Silla Vacía, 4th June 2015).
Finally, it is important to mention that the mandate has 
taken into account the contributions of local social initiatives 
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for the reconstruction of memory and truth, as well as the 
recommendations of the victims’ delegation in La Habana. These 
facts could contribute positively to the legitimation of the TC. 
Nonetheless, one hurdle the commission could face is to raise 
very high expectations. The nature of the commissions will force 
the prioritization of emblematic cases that respond to collective 
patterns of violence and not to individual ones. As Hayner (2011, 
p. 75) points out “indeed, it is evidently unrealistic to expect full 
and complete information about all violations where the number 
of victims is very high (…) However, good faith to provide as much 
information as possible, and to preserve and make publicly available 
any existing State archives, can be expected” and count as a positive 
result for the commission.
 Some considerations for the impact
The Colombian TC’s proposal establishes clearly that the commission 
is an extra-judicial mechanism and its results cannot be used as 
evidence in trials, nor can judicial authorities have access to TC files 
(Joint Communiqué 53, 4th July 2015). These are serious restrictions 
for the commission’s results and the impact they may have, although 
it may facilitate the confessions of people who do not want to 
incriminate themselves or promote testimonials of new witnesses. 
Despite these restrictions, the disconnection of the TC and the courts 
at this point does not necessarily translate into amnesty. 
An additional restriction is the fact that the responsibilities in 
the conflict will be assumed “voluntarily” (Joint Communiqué 53, 
4th July 2015). This constitutes a risk for the trustworthiness of the 
information that will be provided by perpetrators. It is still unclear if 
in Colombia the formula truth for amnesty will take place, but if that 
were the case, what incentives would remain for perpetrators to tell 
the truth? And what kind of truth is going to be pursued when it is 
assumed as a voluntary contribution and not as a duty, in particular 
for the perpetrators? However, although the majority of TCs have 
not had any judiciary powers, this does not mean that in the future 
it is unlikely that TCs’ results will have a positive impact in judicial 
accountability. This could happen with a delay like in the cases of 
Argentina, Chile, Chad, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Nigeria 
and Peru (Bakiner, 2014). 
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The discussion behind the relationship between truth and 
justice relies on how complementary or exclusive judicial and 
extra-judicial mechanisms might be. According to Bakiner (2014, 
p. 7) “truth commissions’ contribution to HHRR accountability 
or impunity is [still] a controversial issue”. Hayner (2011, p. 91), 
quoting José Miguel Vivanco’s statements in relation to the TC in 
Guatemala, wrote:
When TCs seemed to suddenly gain prominence [1990’s] 
(Hayner, 1994, p. 606f), there was considerable worry from 
HHRR advocates about the intention and the impact of these 
bodies, particularly in contexts where criminal justice was 
unlikely and political resistance to accountability was high. There 
was, simply, a suspicion that truth commissions were likely to 
weaken the prospects for proper justice in the courts, or even 
that commissions were sometimes intentionally employed as a 
way to avoid more serious accountability (…) [in many contexts: 
Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Liberia, etc.] there has been either an explicit or an implicit link 
between an agreement for a truth commission and an agreement, 
understanding, or hope that there would be no trials. 
However, there is no evidence that TCs advocate impunity or 
serve as a replacement or distraction from trials, in most of the cases 
“the failure to prosecute has resulted from many other factors, but 
not from the existence of TC” (Bakiner, 2014, p. 29). 
On the contrary, the judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms 
could be interpreted as complementary when the strengths of one 
balance the weaknesses of the other (Uprinmy/Saffon, 2006). This 
approach assumes that both rights are necessary. In the Colombian 
case, there is a need for collective truth because some parts of the 
national history still remain denied or unknown and these historical 
voids cannot be fulfilled just with criminal justice. Partially this is 
what happened with the demobilization of the Paramilitary Forces, 
in which there was an effort to reconstruct truth, but it failed as not 
all perpetrators told the truth and the historical reconstruction of 
cases was a personal decision of the judges and not an obligation. 
Moreover, from the testimonials given by perpetrators more than 
12.869 cases were identified, in which a third perpetrator, not 
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included in the transitional justice program, was accused (García, 
2014). Nonetheless, until today the Public Prosecutor’s Office has 
done nothing about it. This means that there is a disconnection 
between different mechanisms and institutions and for this reason 
the establishment of a TC should prevent this lack of coordination to 
happen again. 
Although sometimes TCs are perceived as innocuous because 
they do not have judiciary powers, in perspective, trials have had 
scarce achievements as well. For example, the mixed international 
tribunals, the international tribunals and the International Criminal 
Court have performed modestly (Hayner, 2011), whereas the TCs in 
Argentina, Guatemala, Chile and South Africa were very important 
for reconciliation in those countries. In this respect, some TCs have 
been set up specifically to foster reconciliation. The best example 
is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but 
the correlation between truth and reconciliation is also uncertain 
(Hayner, 1994; Twose/Mahoney, 2015). 
Reconciliation is a long and complex process that TCs cannot 
promise to achieve because individual forgiveness is a victims’ right; 
therefore, TCs are better at advancing in the national reconciliation 
(Villa-Vicencio, 2006; Bakiner, 2014). On a social level truth 
may facilitate reconciliation but it should be accompanied with 
deliberations on how to face the future (USIP, 2008). In the case of 
Colombia, the term used in the name of the TC is not reconciliation 
but coexistence and it is supposed to be achieved in local and regional 
levels. Within this framework, this objective is perfectly attainable 
taking coexistence as the first step for reconciliation. Reconciliation 
is a process because it consists on creating an environment in which 
the parties can coexist, shortening the social distance and enabling 
the possibility to pursue goals together (Villa-Vicencio, 2006). What 
it has to be defined in Colombia is how the approximation between 
victims and perpetrators will be, how the commissions will operate 
in the regions and how specific parts of the society, in particular the 
minorities, are going to be included. 
A further purpose of TCs is the acknowledgment of victims’ 
suffering and perpetrators’ responsibility, normally followed by 
public apologies that seek to restore the dignity and respect that 
was once violently taken from the victims (Marrus, 2006). In this 
sense, TCs recognize an asymmetry between the victims’ and the 
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perpetrators’ stories and therefore, they give a voice to victims that 
normally trials do not give (ICG, 2013; Bakiner, 2014). Victims’ 
narratives help to comprehend the dimensions of harm and their 
characteristics, so a more complete reparations program can 
be designed. Nonetheless, perpetrators’ narratives still remain 
important, even for TC because they allow an understanding of 
the most detailed dynamics of violence and atrocity. “The resulting 
collective narrative would concern not only violence, but also wider 
socio-economic harms” (ICG, 2013, p. 31).
As a consequence, one could infer that the concrete role and 
impact of truth commissions do not necessarily damage or weaken 
criminal justice (Hayner, 1994). On the contrary, 
[…] Many truth commissions have made significant efforts to try 
to advance prosecutions, including by providing to prosecutors 
the names of suspects and clear evidence on which to build a 
case. But even beyond the possibility of providing information 
for trials, many HHRR advocates now see truth commissions 
generally as a positive step toward accountability. Among those 
advocating for criminal justice, the fear of a ‘trade-off’ between 
truth and justice has largely receded. (Hayner, 2002, p. 92) 
In sum, the articulation of the extrajudicial truth and the 
judicial truth will account better for a successful transitional justice 
process than the complete reliance on one of them (Uprinmy/
Saffon, 2006).
v. Challenges and opportunities
1. There are many truth and memory initiatives already implemented. 
This means there is much information previously found about the 
dynamics of HHRR abuses, the perpetrators and the logic behind 
certain actions (Antequera, 2014). Nonetheless, detailed information 
about the purposes of violence, especially the one conducted by the 
State, is still unclear. According to Antequera (2014), since the issue 
of Law 1448/2011, an imaginary of the Colombian conflict, merely as 
a confrontation between two sides, has been promoted. This hinders 
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the plurality of logics behind the actual confrontation that includes 
actors who have either directly supported the conflict or have taken 
advantage of it according to their interests. 
As a consequence, the definition of violence assumed by the 
TC is very important. When violence is understood from a structural 
point of view, further considerations such as the socio-economic 
harm and who the beneficiaries from the conflict in Colombia are, 
should be examined (Castillejo, 2014). There is no doubt about the 
conflict’s function in land looting in Colombia, nurtured by the 
enforced displacement of entire populations, the establishment of 
legal and illegal powers, the participation of foreign countries and 
even of the Colombian security agencies. The ICG (2013, p. 31) 
states in this regard, “the most significant added value of a TC would 
be to reveal the thick web of connections between armed groups, 
economics, politics and violence”.
Therefore, the TC has to complete this information, 
concentrating on the new challenges, unanswered questions and 
a more exhaustive inquiry to fill gaps of information. The prior 
findings should be re-legitimized, re-built and incorporated in the 
reconstruction of truth, and their impact should be strengthened in 
the public sphere as well. One of the most important contributions 
for truth and memory in Colombia is the report called Basta Ya 
issued by the CNMH (2013). This report represents the most 
complete research ever done in Colombia in regard to conflict, its 
origins, motives, dynamics, its relationship with justice, victims and 
historical memory. The challenge of the TC is how to articulate 
these findings with its mandate and functions (García, 2014). It is 
crucial to foster relationships between the TC, public and private 
organizations and NGO’s that could provide expert training, access 
to their information and introductions to local communities. “They 
[NGO’s] are also often an important source of collected evidence for 
the commission, and can play a valuable role in facilitating victims 
and general public participation in the truth commission process” 
(USIP, 2008, p. 10). 
2. It is important to recognize that the judicial system in Colombia 
is not perfect, but it is still capable of investigating. Then, the 
challenge for the commission is to articulate its functions with the 
ones of the procedural bodies, combating at the same time their 
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institutional weaknesses (Ceballos, 2009). Although the mandate 
of the TC establishes that the commissions’ files cannot be used 
as evidence in courts and even that the judicial bodies won’t have 
access to them, some collaboration between the two instances could 
exist in regard, for example, to witnesses’ protection, institutional 
independency and under the conditions that the perpetrators should 
accomplish to tell the truth in the commission, in court or in both. 
Besides, if TC’s findings cannot be used in trials, it will mean that 
judiciary bodies have to cover a very similar ground to the one 
already investigated by the commission. 
The commission might pave the way for an improved 
prioritization process, building on work already underway in the 
attorney-general’s office, by producing a preliminary report on 
the general patterns of violence. Its final report could highlight 
information that merits special consideration by the attorney-
general. (ICG, 2013, p. 35)
Furthermore, it is necessary to specify if there is going to be a 
model of amnesty for truth, how it is going to work, when and where. 
The establishment of a TC opens the discussion on how criminal 
justice is going to be achieved and how it will interrelate with the 
TC. In this sense, if the most responsible ones approach proposed by 
the Legal Peace Framework or the Special Jurisdiction for Peace 
proposed in September 2015 are finally going to be assumed, how 
would they relate to the commission? At the same time, how will the 
Military Criminal Justice system be articulated to the transitional 
reforms? The coordination between these systems is crucial to 
avoid impunity, task overlapping and operational ineffectiveness. As 
evidence suggests, 
Even when commissions have made full use of their capacity to 
facilitate prosecutions, courts have neglected their findings. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, had the power to 
force the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
to share the information at its disposal, but the prosecutor 
rejected the possibility. In the end, truth commissions produce 
limited judicial impact, but not necessarily due to their own fault. 
(Bakiner, 2014, p. 27)
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3. Colombia will create its TC with lots of international TCs’ 
experience, learned lessons and good practices. The study of TCs 
in other countries can provide many ‘to-do’ and ‘not-to-do’ lessons. 
For instance, TCs have been gradually acquiring more and more 
tasks, a situation that strengthens the importance of these bodies4 
(Hayner, 2011) but could also represent its failure. In this sense, 
the Colombian TC could also fall into this trap and build a very 
ambitious mandate, trying to cover as many duties as possible. This 
sounds good in theory, but in praxis it would not work because the 
commission won’t be able to fulfill these high expectations. In this 
sense, it is better to have a TC with a realistic scope rather than end 
up in failure. 
4. In terms of political participation there is a big challenge the 
commission will eventually meet and it is the recommendations for 
vetting processes vs. the eventual political participation of FARC-
EP ex-combatants. This topic is challenging because with a highly 
polarized civil society, every decision in regard to prosecution or 
vetting of public servants or military offices will be contrasted with 
the allowance of FARC-EP ex-members to political participation. The 
latter is one of the most important points in FARC-EP’s agenda and 
at the same time, the power of TCs to recommend about vetting and 
institutional reform represents one of the most important political 
impacts the commissions could have (ICG, 2013). Nonetheless, 
A commission may or may not make an explicit recommendation 
for vetting, and if it does, the Government may or may not 
implement it (…) Despite truth commissions’ best efforts, 
recommending vetting does not appear to be a significant 
impact mechanism. Although four of the 15 transitional truth 
commissions demanded the removal of presumed perpetrators 
from office, only one Government has met this demand partially 
[El Salvador]. (Bakiner, 2014, p. 24)
4 Despite of their more limited legal powers, their broader mandate to focus on the 
patterns, causes, and consequences of political violence allows truth commissions to go 
much further in their investigations and conclusions than is generally possible (or even 
appropriate) in a trial (Hayner, 2011, p. 13).
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However, the TC should explore the history of the opposition 
in Colombia, the State’s repressive policies against it and the 
institutions that permitted political exclusion and instigation 
(Antequera Guzmán, 2014). Moreover, it would be necessary 
to inquire on the links between politicians and armed groups 
(FARC-Politics and Para-politics). How are these events going to be 
investigated? As it was said, these situations are part of the invisible 
forces behind the conflict and a narrowed victims/perpetrators 
approach would not allow uncovering institutions and individuals 
supporting violence from backstage. 
5. New paramilitary organizations are operating in Colombia since 
the demobilization of the former paramilitary forces in 2005. 
The Government considers these as criminal gangs, although in 
many ways they preserve the tactics and modus operandi of their 
predecessors, committing HHRR’ abuses against civilians. According 
to the Ombudsman’ Office in Colombia, by November 2014 these 
groups had presence in 168 municipalities in 27 departments 
(Ombudsman’ Office in Colombia official webpage, 4th November 
2014). The question here is: should the TC investigate the atrocities 
committed by these new actors or not? And if yes, how would 
prosecution be conducted? The importance of these new actors 
relies on their connections with recognized conflicting parties 
and their origin as rearmed groups; above all, they are currently 
victimizing populations and violating HHRR (Ceballos, 2009).
6. Colombian society is very polarized. This means that the election 
of the commissioners should be transparent enough, so that it is 
perceived as legitimate and representative. In this sense,
Policymakers could explore the advantages and disadvantages 
of foreign members: greater international legitimacy and 
possibly greater domestic standing in regions where the State 
lacks credibility, versus the risk that the body might seem 
overly influenced by outsiders, thus undermining society’s 
appropriation of its report. (ICG, 2013, p. 33)
The Colombian TC’s proposal says the two parties could 
select a maximum of three international commissioners out of 
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eleven commissioners (Joint Communiqué 53, 4th July 2015). The 
advantages and disadvantages of this approach remain to be seen. 
 Conclusions 
TCs can promote a collective understanding and acknowledgement 
of past HHRR abuses, and if they are successfully embedded in a 
broad justice perspective, they can provide the conditions for peace 
and reconciliation. Therefore, the implementation of TCs should 
mind their articulation with other transitional justice mechanisms 
in order to achieve the best possible process. Nevertheless, TCs goals 
are multilayered and their impact might be complicated to measure. 
In this paper, three conditions were described as the basic aspects 
to evaluate a TC’s effectiveness: 1). The achievement of its mandate, 
2). The accomplishment of its objectives, and 3). The issue of a final 
report and recommendations, which are expected to have some 
political and social impact. 
When critically reviewing the TC proposal issued by the 
Colombian Government and the FARC-EP under these aspects, 
some concerns and opportunities emerged. In terms of the 
objectives, it seems to cover in a comprehensive manner the most 
important goals of TCs, namely the clarification of HHRR abuses, 
the acknowledgment of the victims’ harm and accountability, and 
the promotion of coexistence between former antagonist parties. 
Nonetheless, the dynamics behind violence such as repression 
to political opposition and participation should be part of the 
reconstruction of facts to overcome the limited logic of victims/
perpetrators. At the same time, the selection of the commissioners 
should be transparent enough to guarantee legitimacy. 
When talking about the mandate, the proposal is very complete 
and contemplates contributions made by other organizations and the 
investigation of foreign states, companies, the former Paramilitary 
Forces, among others, in order to clarify the truth about the 
conflict in Colombia. Nevertheless, this could be an advantage and 
a disadvantage. The question here lies on the feasibility of a three-
year TC in a conflict that has lasted very long, includes too many 
actors and whose starting point has not been completely defined 
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yet. Additionally, another issue of concern is the articulation of the 
commission with other transitional justice mechanisms and the 
vague definition of some points of the mandate. 
Finally, in terms of the political impact, it is assumed that 
the judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms are complementary. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the TC results cannot be used in trials 
represents a strong restriction. Moreover, the “voluntary” assumption 
of responsibilities poses many questions as well, especially in regard 
to an eventual truth for amnesty formula. Lastly, the use of the word 
coexistence instead of reconciliation in the TC proposal’s narrative 
is remarkable because it keeps expectations realistic on what the TC 
can achieve. The implementation of the TC in the regions and the 
inclusion of minorities will be crucial in this last point. 
Ultimately, sometimes it is not immediately clear if a 
Government’s commission is more a political tool or an accurate 
reflection of change (Hayner, 1994), but it can contribute if its 
recommendations are successfully enacted when there is enough 
political will or engagement by civil society (Twose/Mahoney, 2015). 
Let’s hope this will be the case for Colombia.
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